

Verification of programs in practice

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- Verification of Java programs (Pathfinder, ESC/Java, Bandera)
- Proof Carrying Code
- Combinations with static analysis

Formal verification. Supplement.

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Java PathFinder (NASA Ames)

early effort to verify code written in usual programming languages
Java PathFinder 1.0: translation from Java to PROMELA (Spin)
- language similarities: treatment of dynamic object creation, threads
- missing aspects (floating point); Spin needs complete model/source
Java PathFinder 2.0: standalone verifier, written in Java
[G. Brat, K. Havelund, S. Park, W. Visser '00]
General architecture:
explicit state model checking
- usual technique for representing large states (structures):
each structural value stored only once and encoded as integer
custom Java virtual machine for model checking, with
- exploration algorithms (issue forward/backward steps in own JVM)
- nondeterministic environment using special methods captured by JVM

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Java PathFinder (cont.)

Verification techniques:

Static analysis

- for constructing program abstractions (by *slicing*)
- for identifying partial order reduction conditions using the SVC (Stanford Validity Checker) theorem prover

Runtime analysis, for detecting potential error conditions:

- race conditions in access to shared variables
- accessing semaphores in different order (potential deadlock)

Performance and verified systems

- coded in Java, 10x slower than Spin; speed: thousands of states/sec.
- verified a control agent for state space operation
- a fragment of a distributed operating system (14 classes, 1 kloc)

Now a SourceForge project: <http://javapathfinder.sourceforge.net>

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Abstraction in Java PathFinder

Source-level transformations generate another Java program that operates on abstract predicates.

```
Abstractions is expressed as special annotation class Abstract;
Abstract.remove(x) // abstracts away x
Abstract.addBoolean("x0", x == 0) // adds predicate x == 0
```

One can also abstract away predicates over several classes:

```
Abstract.addBoolean("xGTy", A.x > B.y);
- generates a predicate for each object pair instantiated from classes A and B
- possible explosion in the number of needed predicates
```

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ESC/Java (DEC/Compaq SRC)

ESC = Extended Static Checking; initially for Modula 3, then Java

- not a model checker, but a static analyzer
- can detect errors such as null references, out-of-bound indices
- for more complex properties *annotations* are used
(invariants, preconditions, postconditions, null/non-null conditions)
- allows modular verification, separately for each method
- verification done using a theorem prover (Simplify)
- modules with unavailable source supplanted by specification files

Similar static analyzers exist for C (`lint`, evolved into `splint`)

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Bandera [Kansas State U.]

A modular verifier for Java programs

- o front-end for program simplification (program slicing)
- a library of frequently-used abstractions
(the user specifies for each variable the desired abstraction)
- ability to restrict the model to a small number of module instances
- a generator for a finite model in a generic format
(guarded command language, easily translated to other specifications)
- interfaces with usual verifiers (SMV, Spin, PVS theorem prover)
- a specification language, and support for formulas based on patterns

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Proof Carrying Code

[Necula & Lee '96, Necula '97]

- A method for safe execution of untrusted code, e.g. net applets
- code consumer defines a set of safety rules
- code producer delivers the code coupled with a formal proof that it satisfies the safety rules
- consumer uses a simple proof checker to establish validity of code and received proof

Key idea: checking a proof is a simple mechanical task (simple checker; small, verifiable trusted code base) while generating a proof is hard (burden falls on code producer)

PCC: Structure of system

Producer

- certifying compiler, generates native code with annotations (e.g. invariants)
- verification condition generator (VCGen)
- VC = predicate whose validity guarantees safe execution
- proof generator (starting from VCGen)

Consumer

- a proof checker: validates correspondence between received code and proof (possibly assisted by a VCGen identical to producer's)

PCC: verification condition generation

- The notion of VC: linked to the rules for program correctness based on preconditions and postconditions established by Floyd (1967)
- a VC is not necessarily the weakest precondition (can be simpler, easier to express and prove)

```
for (i = 0; i < length(a); i++) s += a[i];
```

VC built from predicates of the form

$s : int \wedge l \geq 0$

premise

$i \geq l \rightarrow s : int$

postcondition

$i < l \rightarrow \text{saferd}(mem, a + i) \wedge i + 1 \leq l \wedge s + rd(mem, a + i) : int$

invariant

PCC: advantages

- Validating a proof is much easier than finding it
- ⇒ simple for the consumer, who need only trust proof checker
- Method is tamper-proof: no change in code and/or proof can go undetected (if a changed program checks, it is still safe)
- Verification is performed once, statically; allows subsequent safe execution without inserting run-time checks
- Allows to trust the compiler completely and even to debug it during the development process.

CCured: strongly typed C code

[Necula et al '01]: C programs correct from typing point of view

- combination of type inference and runtime checking
- type inference used to establish as much as possible of the code as being type-safe
- run-time checks are inserted in the rest of the source to ensure correctness of memory access
- basic idea: extending the type system with pointers qualified as **SAFE** (just dereferenced), **SEQ** (for arrays) and **DYNAMIC** (any access)
- additional fields (base and length) are introduced for pointers which are not **SAFE**
- slowdown factor: 1 - 2 (compared to 10-100 for Purify)
- analysis also allows detection of errors

Extensions for metacompilation

Context: *lightweight and semi-formal methods*: sacrifice part of soundness/completeness guarantees to increase practical applicability

Metacompilation [Engler et al '00]: for bugs in operating system code

- allows to check well-defined high-level (API) rules, (e.g., "variable x is protected by semaphore s", "interrupts must be reenabled")
- ⇒ by defining a meta-semantics accessible to the compiler
- rules are specified as automata which transition while analyzing a relevant pattern of source code
- an augmented C compiler applies these extensions to semantic analysis (propagation through the control flow graph, locally or globally)
- results: hundreds of errors in Linux, OpenBSD, Exokernel, etc.

Related approach: automatic extraction of models from source code

- by slicing (also for operating systems)
- models are then analyzed by a model checker